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Memory corruption errors in C/C++ programs remain the most common source of security vulnerabilities in today’s systems.
Control-flow hijacking attacks exploit memory corruption vulnerabilities to divert program execution away from the intended
control flow. Researchers have spent more than a decade studying and refining defenses based on Control-Flow Integrity
(CFI), and this technique is now integrated into several production compilers. However, so far no study has systematically
compared the various proposed CFI mechanisms, nor is there any protocol on how to compare such mechanisms.
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the same test environment. For each mechanism, we evaluate (i) protected types of control-flow transfers, (ii) the precision of
the protection for forward and backward edges. For open-source compiler-based implementations, we additionally evaluate
(iii) the generated equivalence classes and target sets, and (iv) the runtime performance.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Systems programming languages such as C and C++ give programmers a high degree of freedom to
optimize and control how their code uses available resources. While this facilitates the construction of
highly efficient programs, requiring the programmer to manually manage memory and observe typing
rules leads to security vulnerabilities in practice. Memory corruptions, such as buffer overflows, are
routinely exploited by attackers. Despite significant research into exploit mitigations, very few of
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these mitigations have entered practice [Szekeres et al. 2013]. The combination of three such defenses,
(i) Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [PaX-Team 2003], (ii) stack canaries [van de Ven
and Molnar 2004], and (iii) Data Execution Prevention (DEP) [Microsoft 2006] protects against
code-injection attacks, but are unable to fully prevent code-reuse attacks. Modern exploits use
Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) or variants thereof to bypass currently deployed defenses and
divert the control flow to a malicious payload. Common objectives of such payloads include arbitrary
code execution, privilege escalation, and exfiltration of sensitive information.
The goal of Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) [Abadi et al. 2005a] is to restrict the set of possible
control-flow transfers to those that are strictly required for correct program execution. This prevents
code-reuse techniques such as ROP from working because they would cause the program to execute
control-flow transfers which are illegal under CFI. Conceptually, most CFI mechanisms follow a
two-phase process. An analysis phase constructs the Control-Flow Graph (CFG) which approximates
the set of legitimate control-flow transfers. This CFG is then used at runtime by an enforcement
component to ensure that all executed branches correspond to edges in the CFG.
During the analysis phase, the CFG is computed by analyzing either the source code or binary of a
given program. In either case, the limitations of static program analysis lead to an over-approximation
of the control-flow transfers that can actually take place at runtime. This over-approximation limits
the security of the enforced CFI policy because some non-essential edges are included in the CFG.
The enforcement phase ensures that control-flow transfers which are potentially controlled by
an attacker, i.e., those whose targets are computed at runtime, such as indirect branches and return
instructions, correspond to edges in the CFG produced by the analysis phase. These targets are com-
monly divided into forward edges such as indirect calls, and backward edges like return instructions
(so called because they return control back to the calling function). All CFI mechanisms protect
forward edges, but some do not handle backward edges. Assuming code is static and immutable 1,
CFI can be enforced by instrumenting existing indirect control-flow transfers at compile time through
a modified compiler, ahead of time through static binary rewriting, or during execution through
dynamic binary translation. The types of indirect transfers that are subject to such validation and the
number of valid targets per branch varies greatly between different CFI defenses. These differences
have a major impact on the security and performance of the CFI mechanism.
CFI does not seek to prevent memory corruption, which is the root cause of most vulnerabilities
in C and C++ code. While mechanisms that enforce spatial [Nagarakatte et al. 2009] and tempo-
ral [Nagarakatte et al. 2010] memory safety eliminate memory corruption (and thereby control-flow
hijacking attacks), existing mechanisms are considered prohibitively expensive. In contrast, CFI
defenses offer reasonably low overheads while making it substantially harder for attackers to gain
arbitrary code execution in vulnerable programs. Moreover, CFI requires few changes to existing
source code which allows complex software to be protected in a mostly automatic fashion. While the
idea of restricting branch instructions based on target sets predates CFI [Kiriansky 2013; Kiriansky
et al. 2002; PaX-Team 2003], Abadi et al.’s seminal paper [Abadi et al. 2005a] was the first formal
description of CFI with an accompanying implementation. Since this paper was published over a
decade ago, the research community has proposed a large number of variations of the original idea.
More recently, CFI implementations have been integrated into production-quality compilers, tools,
and operating systems.
Current CFI mechanisms can be compared along two major axes: performance and security. In
the scientific literature, performance overhead is usually measured through the SPEC CPU2006
benchmarks. Unfortunately, sometimes only a subset of the benchmarks is used for evaluation. To
evaluate security, many authors have used the Average Indirect target Reduction (AIR) [Zhang and
Sekar 2013] metric that counts the overall reduction of targets for any indirect control-flow transfer.
1DEP marks code pages as executable and readable by default. Programs may subsequently change permissions to make code
pages writable using platform-specific APIs such as mprotect. Mitigations such as PaX MPROTECT, SELinux [McCarty
2004], and the ProcessDynamicCodePolicy Windows API restrict how page permissions can be changed to prevent
code injection and modification.
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
A:3
Current evaluation techniques do not adequately distinguish among CFI mechanisms along these
axes. Performance measurements are all in the same range, between 0% and 20% across different
benchmarks with only slight variations for the same benchmark. Since the benchmarks are evaluated
on different machines with different compilers and software versions, these numbers are close to the
margin of measurement error. On the security axis, AIR is not a desirable metric for two reasons.
First, all CFI mechanisms report similar AIR numbers (a > 99% reduction of branch targets), which
makes AIR unfit to compare individual CFI mechanisms against each other. Second, even a large
reduction of targets often leaves enough targets for an attacker to achieve the desired goals [Carlini
and Wagner 2014; Davi et al. 2014b; Göktas et al. 2014], making AIR unable to evaluate security of
CFI mechanisms on an absolute scale.
We systematize the different CFI mechanisms (where “mechanism” captures both the analysis
and enforcement aspects of an implementation) and compare them against metrics for security and
performance. By introducing metrics for these areas, our analysis allows the objective comparison of
different CFI mechanisms both on an absolute level and relatively against other mechanisms. This in
turn allows potential users to assess the trade-offs of individual CFI mechanisms and choose the one
that is best suited to their use case. Further, our systematization provides a more meaningful way
to classify CFI mechanism than the ill-defined and inconsistently used “coarse” and “fine” grained
classification.
To evaluate the security of CFI mechanisms we follow a comprehensive approach, classifying
them according to a qualitative and a quantitative analysis. In the qualitative security discussion
we compare the strengths of individual solutions on a conceptual level by evaluating the CFI policy
of each mechanism along several axes: (i) precision in the forward direction, (ii) precision in the
backward direction, (iii) supported control-flow transfer types according to the source programming
language, and (iv) reported performance. In the quantitative evaluation, we measure the target sets
generated by each CFI mechanism for the SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks. The precision and security
guarantees of a CFI mechanism depend on the precision of target sets used at runtime, i.e., across all
control-flow transfers, how many superfluous targets are reachable through an individual control-flow
transfer. We compute these target sets for all available CFI mechanisms and compare the ranked sizes
of the sets against each other. This methodology lets us compare the actual sets used for the integrity
checks of one mechanism against other mechanisms. In addition, we collect all indirect control-flow
targets used for the individual SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks and use these sets as a lower bound on
the set of required targets. We use this lower bound to compute how close a mechanism is to an ideal
CFI mechanism. An ideal CFI mechanism is one where the enforced CFG’s edges exactly correspond
to the executed branches.
As a second metric, we evaluate the performance impact of open-sourced, compiler-based CFI
mechanisms. In their corresponding publications, each mechanism was evaluated on different hard-
ware, different libraries, and different operating systems, using either the full or a partial set of
SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks. We cannot port all evaluated CFI mechanisms to the same baseline
compiler. Therefore, we measure the overhead of each mechanism relative to the compiler it was
integrated into. This apples-to-apples comparison highlights which SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks are
most useful when evaluating CFI.
The paper is structured as follows. We first give a detailed background of the theory underlying
the analysis phase of CFI mechanisms. This allows us to then qualitatively compare the different
mechanisms on the precision of their analysis. We then quantify this comparison with a novel metric.
This is followed by our performance results for the different implementation. Finally, we highlight
best practices and future research directions for the CFI community identified during our evaluation
of the different mechanisms, and conclude.
Overall, we present the following contributions:
(1) a systematization of CFI mechanisms with a focus on discussing the major different CFI mecha-
nisms and their respective trade-offs,
(2) a taxonomy for classifying the underlying analysis of a CFI mechanism,
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1 void foo ( i n t a ) {
2 re turn ;
3 }
4 void b a r ( i n t a ) {
5 re turn ;
6 }
7 void baz ( void ) {
8 i n t a = i n p u t ( ) ;
9 void (∗ f p t r ) ( i n t ) ;
10 i f ( a ) {
11 f p t r = foo ;
12 f p t r ( ) ;
13 } e l s e {
14 f p t r = b a r ;
15 f p t r ( ) ;
16 }
17 }
Fig. 1: Simplified example of over approximation in static analysis.
(3) presentation of both a qualitative and quantitative security metric and the evaluation of existing
CFI mechanisms along these metrics, and
(4) a detailed performance study of existing CFI mechanisms.
2. FOUNDATIONAL CONCEPTS
We first introduce CFI and discuss the two components of most CFI mechanisms: (i) the analysis
that defines the CFG (which inherently limits the precision that can be achieved) and (ii) the runtime
instrumentation that enforces the generated CFG. Secondly, we classify and systematize different
types of control-flow transfers and how they are used in programming languages. Finally, we briefly
discuss the CFG precision achievable with different types of static analysis. For those interested, a
more comprehensive overview of static analysis techniques is available in Appendix B.
2.1. Control-Flow Integrity
CFI is a policy that restricts the execution flow of a program at runtime to a predetermined CFG
by validating indirect control-flow transfers. On the machine level, indirect control-flow transfers
may target any executable address of mapped memory, but in the source language (C, C++, or
Objective-C) the targets are restricted to valid language constructs such as functions, methods and
switch statement cases. Since the aforementioned languages rely on manual memory management,
it is left to the programmer to ensure that non-control data accesses do not interfere with accesses
to control data such that programs execute legitimate control flows. Absent any security policy, an
attacker can therefore exploit memory corruption to redirect the control-flow to an arbitrary memory
location, which is called control-flow hijacking. CFI closes the gap between machine and source code
semantics by restricting the allowed control-flow transfers to a smaller set of target locations. This
smaller set is determined per indirect control-flow location. Note that languages providing complete
memory and type safety generally do not need to be protected by CFI. However, many of these
“safe” languages rely on virtual machines and libraries written in C or C++ that will benefit from CFI
protection.
Most CFI mechanisms determine the set of valid targets for each indirect control-flow transfer
by computing the CFG of the program. The security guarantees of a CFI mechanism depend
on the precision of the CFG it constructs. The CFG cannot be perfectly precise for non-trivial
programs. Because the CFG is statically determined, there is always some over-approximation
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due to imprecision of the static analysis. An equivalence class is the set of valid targets for a given
indirect control-flow transfer. Throughout the following, we reference Figure 1. Assuming an analysis
based on function types or a flow-insensitive analysis, both foo() and bar() end up in the same
equivalence class. Thus, at line 12 and line 15 either function can be called. However, from the source
code we can tell that at line 12 only foo() should be called, and at line 15 only bar() should be
called. While this specific problem can be addressed with a flow-sensitive analysis, all known static
program analysis techniques are subject to some over-approximation (see Appendix B).
Once the CFI mechanism has computed an approximate CFG, it has to enforce its security
policy. We first note that CFI does not have to enforce constraints for control-flows due to direct
branches because their targets are immune to memory corruption thanks to DEP. Instead, it focuses
on attacker-corruptible branches such as indirect calls, jumps, and returns. In particular, it must
protect control-flow transfers that allow runtime-dependent, targets such as void (*fptr)(int)
in Figure 1. These targets are stored in either a register or a memory location depending on the
compiler and the exact source code. The indirection such targets provide allows flexibility as, e.g.,
the target of a function may depend on a call-back that is passed from another module. Another
example of indirect control-flow transfers is return instructions that read the return address from the
stack. Without such an indirection, a function would have to explicitly enumerate all possible callers
and check to which location to return to based on an explicit comparison.
For indirect call sites, the CFI enforcement component validates target addresses before they
are used in an indirect control-flow transfer. This approach detects code pointers (including return
addresses) that were modified by an attacker – if the attacker’s chosen target is not a member of the
statically determined set.
2.2. Classification of Control-Flow Transfers
Control-flow transfers can broadly be separated into two categories: (i) forward and (ii) backward.
Forward control-flow transfers are those that move control to a new location inside a program. When
a program returns control to a prior location, we call this a backward control-flow2.
A CPU’s instruction-set architecture (ISA) usually offers two forward control-flow transfer in-
structions: call and jump. Both of these are either direct or indirect, resulting in four different types
of forward control-flow:
— direct jump: is a jump to a constant, statically determined target address. Most local control-flow,
such as loops or if-then-else cascaded statements, use direct jumps to manage control.
— direct call: is a call to a constant, statically determined target address. Static function calls, for
example, use direct call instructions.
— indirect jump: is a jump to a computed, i.e., dynamically determined target address. Examples
for indirect jumps are switch-case statements using a dispatch table, Procedure Linkage Tables
(PLT), as well as the threaded code interpreter dispatch optimization [Bell 1973; Debaere and van
Campenhout 1990; Kogge 1982].
— indirect call: is a call to a computed, i.e., dynamically determined target address. The following
three examples are relevant in practice:
Function pointers are often used to emulate object-oriented method dispatch in classical record
data structures, such as C structs, or for passing callbacks to other functions.
vtable dispatch is the preferred way to implement dynamic dispatch to C++ methods. A C++
object keeps a pointer to its vtable, a table containing pointers to all virtual methods of its dynamic
type. A method call, therefore, requires (i) dereferencing the vtable pointer, (ii) computing table
index using the method offset determined by the object’s static type, and (iii) an indirect call
instruction to the table entry referenced in the previous step. In the presence of multiple inheritance,
or multiple dispatch, dynamic dispatch is slightly more complicated.
2Note the ambiguity of a backward edge in machine code (i.e., a backward jump to an earlier memory location) which is
different from a backward control-flow transfer as used in CFI.
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Smalltalk-style send-method dispatch that requires a dynamic type look-up. Such a dynamic
dispatch using a send-method in Smalltak, Objective-C, or JavaScript requires walking the class
hierarchy (or the prototype chain in JavaScript) and selecting the first method with a matching
identifier. This procedure is required for all method calls and therefore impacts performance
negatively. Note that, e.g., Objective-C uses a lookup cache to reduce the overhead.
We note that jump instructions can also be either conditional or unconditional. For the purposes of
this paper this distinction is irrelevant.
All common ISAs support backward and forward indirect control-flow transfers. For example, the
x86 ISA supports backward control-flow transfers using just one instruction: return, or just ret. A
return instruction is the symmetric counterpart of a call instruction, and a compiler emits function
prologues and epilogues to form such pairs. A call instruction pushes the address of the immediately
following instruction onto the native machine stack. A return instruction pops the address off the
native machine stack and updates the CPU’s instruction pointer to point to this address. Notice that a
return instruction is conceptually similar to an indirect jump instruction, since the return address is
unknown a priori. Furthermore, compilers are emitting call-return pairs by convention that hardware
usually does not enforce. By modifying return addresses on the stack, an attacker can “return” to
all addresses in a program, the foundation of return-oriented programming [Checkoway et al. 2010;
Roemer et al. 2012; Shacham 2007].
Control-flow transfers can become more complicated in the presence of exceptions. Exception
handling complicates control-flows locally, i.e., within a function, for example by moving control
from a try-block into a catch-block. Global exception-triggered control-flow manipulation, i.e.,
interprocedural control-flows, require unwinding stack frames on the current stack until a matching
exception handler is found.
Other control-flow related issues that CFI mechanisms should (but not always do) address are: (i)
separate compilation, (ii) dynamic linking, and (iii) compiling libraries. These present challenges
because the entire CFG may not be known at compile time. This problem can be solved by relying
on LTO, or dynamically constructing the combined CFG. Finally, keep in mind that, in general, not
all control-flow transfers can be recovered from a binary.
Summing up, our classification scheme of control-flow transfers is as follows:
—CF.1: backward control-flow,
—CF.2: forward control-flow using direct jumps,
—CF.3: forward control-flow using direct calls,
—CF.4: forward control-flow using indirect jumps,
—CF.5: forward control-flow using indirect calls supporting function pointers,
—CF.6: forward control-flow using indirect calls supporting vtables,
—CF.7: forward control-flow using indirect calls supporting Smalltalk-style method dispatch,
—CF.8: complex control-flow to support exception handling,
—CF.9: control-flow supporting language features such as dynamic linking, separate compilation,
etc.
According to this classification, the C programming language uses control-flow transfers 1–5, 8
(for setjmp/longjmp) and 9, whereas the C++ programming language allows all control-flow transfers
except no. 7.
2.3. Classification of Static Analysis Precision
As we saw in Section 2.1, the security guarantees of a CFI mechanism ultimately depend on the
precision of the CFG that it computes. This precision is in turn determined by the type of static
analysis used. For the purposes of this paper, the following classification summarizes prior work to
determine forward control-flow transfer analysis precision (see Appendix B for full details). In order
of increasing static analysis precision (SAP), our classifications are:
— SAP.F.0: No forward branch validation
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— SAP.F.1a: ad-hoc algorithms and heuristics
— SAP.F.1b: context- and flow-insensitive analysis
— SAP.F.1c: labeling equivalence classes
— SAP.F.2: class-hierarchy analysis
— SAP.F.3: rapid-type analysis
— SAP.F.4a: flow-sensitive analysis
— SAP.F.4b: context-sensitive analysis
— SAP.F.5: context- and flow-sensitive analysis
— SAP.F.6: dynamic analysis (optimistic)
The following classification summarizes prior work to determine backward control-flow transfer
analysis precision:
— SAP.B.0: No backward branch validation
— SAP.B.1: Labeling equivalence classes
— SAP.B.2: Shadow stack
Note that there is well established and vast prior work in static analysis that goes well beyond the
scope of this paper [Nielson et al. 2009]. The goal of our systematization is merely to summarize the
most relevant aspects and use them to shed more light on the precision aspects of CFI.
2.4. Nomenclature and Taxonomy
Prior work on CFI usually classifies mechanisms into fine-grained and coarse-grained. Over time,
however, these terms have been used to describe different systems with varying granularity and have,
therefore, become overloaded and imprecise. In addition, prior work only uses a rough separation
into forward and backward control-flow transfers without considering sub types or precision. We
hope that the classifications here will allow a more precise and consistent definition of the precision
of CFI mechanisms underlying analysis, and will encourage the CFI community to use the most
precise techniques available from the static analysis literature.
3. SECURITY
In this section we present a security analysis of existing CFI implementations. Drawing on the
foundational knowledge in Section 2, we present a qualitative analysis of the theoretical security of
different CFI mechanisms based on the policies that they implement. We then give a quantitative
evaluation of a selection of CFI implementations. Finally, we survey previous security evaluations
and known attacks against CFI.
3.1. Qualitative Security Guarantees
Our qualitative analysis of prior work and proposed CFI implementations relies on the classifica-
tions of the previous section (cf. Section 2) to provide a higher resolution view of precision and
security. Figure 2 summarizes our findings among four dimensions based on the author’s reported
results and analysis techniques. Figure 3 presents our verified results for open source LLVM-based
implementations that we have selected. Further, it adds a quantitative argument based on our work in
Section 3.2.
In Figure 2 the axes and values were calculated as follows. Note that (i) the scale of each axis
varies based on the number of data points required and (ii) weaker/slower always scores lower and
stronger/faster higher. Therefore, the area of the spider plot roughly estimates the security/precision
of a given mechanism:
— CF: supported control-flow transfers, assigned based on our classification scheme in Section 2.2;
— RP: reported performance numbers. Performance is quantified on a scale of 1-10 by taking the
arctangent of reported runtime overhead and normalizing for high granularity near the median
overhead. An implementation with no overhead receives a full score of 10, and one with about
35% or greater overhead receives a minimum score of 1.
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— SAP.F: static-analysis precision of forward control-flows, assigned based on our classification in
Section 2.3; and
— SAP.B: static-analysis precision of backward control-flows, assigned based on our classification in
Section 2.3.
The shown CFI implementations are ordered chronologically by publication year, and the colors
indicate whether a CFI implementation works on the binary-level (blue), relies on source-code
(green), or uses other mechanisms (red), such as hardware implementations.
Our classification and categorization efforts for reported performance were hindered by method-
ological variances in benchmarking. Experiments were conducted on different machines, different
operating systems, and also different or incomplete benchmark suites. Classifying and categorizing
static analysis precision was impeded by the high level, imprecise descriptions of the implemented
static analysis by various authors. Both of these impediments, naturally, are sources of imprecision
in our evaluation.
Comprehensive protection through CFI requires the validation of both forward and backward
branches. This requirement means that the reported performance impact for forward-only approaches
(i.e., SafeDispatch, T-VIP, VTV, IFCC, vfGuard, and VTint) is restricted to partial protection. The
performance impact for backward control-flows must be considered as well, when comparing these
mechanisms to others with full protection.
CFI mechanisms satisfying SAP.B.2, i.e., using a shadow stack to obtain high precision for back-
ward control-flows are: original CFI [Abadi et al. 2005a], MoCFI [Davi et al. 2012], HAFIX [Arias
et al. 2015; Davi et al. 2014a], and Lockdown [Payer et al. 2015]. PathArmor emulates a shadow
stack through validating the last-branch register (LBR).
Increasing the precision of static analysis techniques that validate whether any given control-flow
transfer corresponds to an edge in the CFG decreases the performance of the CFI mechanism. Most
implementations choose to combine precise results of static analysis into an equivalence class.
Each such equivalence class receives a unique identifier, often referred to as a label, which the CFI
enforcement component validates at runtime. By not using a shadow stack, or any other comparable
high-precision backward control-flow transfer validation mechanism, even high precision forward
control-flow transfer static analysis becomes imprecise due to labeling. The explanation for this loss
in precision is straightforward: to validate a control-flow transfer, all callers of a function need to carry
the same label. Labeling, consequently, is a substantial source of imprecision (see Section 3.2 for
more details). The notable exception in this case is piCFI, which uses dynamic information, to activate
pre-determined edges, dynamically enabling high-resolution, precise control-flow graph (somewhat
analogous to dynamic points-to sets [Mock et al. 2001]. Borrowing a term from information-flow
control [Sabelfeld and Myers 2003], piCFI can, however, suffer from label creep by accumulating
too many labels from the static CFG.
CFI implementations introducing imprecision via labeling are: the original CFI paper [Abadi
et al. 2005a], control-flow locking [Bletsch et al. 2011], CF-restrictor [Pewny and Holz 2013],
CCFIR [Zhang et al. 2013], MCFI [Niu and Tan 2014a], KCoFI [Criswell et al. 2014b], and
RockJIT [Niu and Tan 2014b].
According to the criteria established in analyzing points-to precision, we find that at the time
of this writing, piCFI [Niu and Tan 2015b] offers the highest precision due to leveraging dynamic
points-to information. piCFI’s predecessors, RockJIT [Niu and Tan 2014b] and MCFI [Niu and Tan
2014a], already offered a high precision due to the use of context-sensitivity in the form of types.
Ideal PathArmor also scores well when subject to our evaluation: high-precision in both directions,
forward and backward, but is hampered by limited hardware resources (LBR size) and restricting
protection to the main executable (i.e., trusting libraries). Lockdown [Payer et al. 2015] offers high
precision on the backward edges but derives its equivalence classes from the number of libraries used
in an application and is therefore inherently limited in the precision of the forward edges. IFCC [Tice
et al. 2014] offers variable static analysis granularity. On the one hand, IFCC describes a Full mode
that uses type information, similar to piCFI and its predecessors. On the other hand, IFCC mentions
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CF
SAP.F SAP.B
RP
(a) Orig. CFI
[Abadi et al. 2005a]
CF
SAP.F SAP.B
RP
(b) Hypersafe [Wang
and Jiang 2010]
CF
SAP.F SAP.B
RP
(c) CF-Locking
[Bletsch et al. 2011]
CF
SAP.F SAP.B
RP
(d) MoCFI
[Davi et al. 2012]
CF
SAP.F SAP.B
RP
(e) MIP
[Niu and Tan 2013]
CF
SAP.F SAP.B
RP
(f) kBouncer
[Pappas et al. 2013]
CF
SAP.F SAP.B
RP
(g)
CF-Restrictor [Pewny
and Holz 2013]
CF
SAP.F SAP.B
RP
(h) CCFIR
[Zhang et al. 2013]
CF
SAP.F SAP.B
RP
(i) bin-CFI [Zhang
and Sekar 2013]
CF
SAP.F SAP.B
RP
(j) ROPecker
[Cheng et al. 2014]
CF
SAP.F SAP.B
RP
(k) KCoFI
[Criswell et al. 2014a]
CF
SAP.F
RP
(l) SafeDispatch
[Jang et al. 2014]
CF
SAP.F
RP
(m) T-VIP [Gawlik
and Holz 2014]
CF
SAP.F SAP.B
RP
(n) HW-asst. CFI
[Davi et al. 2014a]
CF
SAP.F SAP.B
RP
(o) RockJIT
[Niu and Tan 2014b]
CF
SAP.F
RP
(p) VTV
[Tice et al. 2014]
CF
SAP.F SAP.B
RP
(q) O-CFI
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Fig. 2: CFI implementation comparison: supported control-flows (CF), reported performance (RP),
static analysis precision: forward (SAP.F) and backward (SAP.B). Backward (SAP.B) is omitted for
mechanisms that do not support back edges. Color coding of CFI implementations: binary are blue,
source-based are green, others red.
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Fig. 3: Quantitative comparison: control-flows (CF), quantitative security (Q), reported performance
(RP), static analysis precision: forward (SAP.F) and backward (SAP.B).
less precise modes, such as using a single set for all destinations, and separating by function arity.
With the exception of Hypersafe [Wang and Jiang 2010], all other evaluated CFI implementations
with supporting academic publications offer lower precision of varying degrees, at most as precise as
SAP.F.3.
3.2. Quantitative Security Guarantees
Quantitatively assessing how much security a CFI mechanism provides is challenging as attacks are
often program dependent and different implementations might allow different attacks to succeed. So
far, the only existing quantitative measure of the security of a CFI implementation is Average Indirect
Target Reduction (AIR). Unfortunately, AIR is known to be a weak proxy for security [Tice et al.
2014]. A more meaningful metric must focus on the number of targets (i.e., number of equivalence
classes) available to an attacker. Furthermore, it should recognize that smaller classes are more
secure, because they provide less attack surface. Thus, an implementation with a small number of
large equivalence classes is more vulnerable than an implementation with a large number of small
equivalence classes.
One possible metric is the product of the number of equivalence classes (EC) and the inverse of the
size of the largest class (LC), see Equation 1. Larger products indicate a more secure mechanism as
the product increases with the number of equivalence classes and decreases with the size of the largest
class. More equivalence classes means that each class is smaller, and thus provides less attack surface
to an adversary. Controlling for the size of the largest class attempts to control for outliers, e.g., one
very large and thus vulnerable class and many smaller ones. A more sophisticated version would
also consider the usability and functionality of the sets. Usability considers whether or not they are
located on an attacker accessible “hot” path, and if so how many times they are used. Functionality
evaluates the quality of the sets, whether or not they include “dangerous” functions like mprotect. A
large equivalence class that is pointed to by many indirect calls on the hot path poses a higher risk
because it is more accessible to the attacker.
EC ∗ 1
LC
= QuantitativeSecurity (1)
This metric is not perfect, but it allows a meaningful direct comparison of the security and precision
of different CFI mechanisms, which AIR does not. The gold standard would be adversarial analysis.
However, this currently requires a human to perform the analysis on a per-program basis. This leads
to a large number of methodological issues: how many analysts, which programs and inputs, how
to combine the results, etc. Such a study is beyond the scope of this work, which instead uses our
proposed metric which can be measured programatically.
This section measures the number and sizes of sets to allow a meaningful, direct comparison of
the security provided by different implementations. Moreover, we report the dynamically observed
number of sets and their sizes. This quantifies the maximum achievable precision from the imple-
ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
A:11
mentations’ CFG analysis, and shows how over-approximate they were for a given execution of the
program.
3.2.1. Implementations. We evaluate four compiler-based, open-source CFI mechanisms IFCC,
LLVM-CFI, MCFI, and piCFI. For IFCC and MCFI we also evaluated the different analysis techniques
available in the implementation. Note that we evaluate two different versions of LLVM-CFI, the
first release in LLVM 3.7 and the second, highly modified version in LLVM 3.9. In addition to the
compiler-based solutions, we also evaluate Lockdown, which is a binary-based CFI implementation.
MCFI and piCFI already have a built-in reporting mechanism. For the other mechanisms we extend
the instrumentation pass and report the number and size of the produced target sets. We then used the
implementations to compile, and for piCFI run, the SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks to produce the data
we report here. piCFI must be run because it does dynamic target activation. This does tie our results
to the ref data set for SPEC CPU2006, because as with any dynamic analysis the results will depend
on the input.
IFCC3 comes with four different CFG analysis techniques: single, arity, simplified, and full. Single
creates only one equivalence class for the entire program, resulting in the weakest possible CFI
policy. Arity groups functions into equivalence classes based on their number of arguments. Simplified
improves on this by recognizing three types of arguments: composite, integer, or function pointer.
Full considers the precise return type and types of each argument. We expect full to yield the largest
number of equivalence classes with the smallest sizes, as it performs the most exact distribution of
targets.
Both MCFI and piCFI rely on the same underlying static analysis. The authors claim that disabling
tail calls is the single most important precision enhancement for their CFG analysis [Niu and Tan
2015a]. We measure the impact of this option on our metric. MCFI and piCFI are also unique in
that their policy and enforcement mechanisms consider backward edges as well as forward edges.
When comparing to other implementations, we only consider forward edges. This ensures direct
comparability for the number and size of sets. The results for backward edges are presented as
separate entries in the figures.
As of LLVM 3.7, LLVM-CFI could not be directly compared to the other CFI implementations
because its policy was strictly more limited. Instead of considering all forward, or all forward and
backward edges, LLVM-CFI 3.7 focused on virtual calls and ensures that virtual, and non-virtual
calls are performed on objects of the correct dynamic type. As of LLVM 3.9, LLVM-CFI has added
support for all indirect calls. Despite these differences, we show the full results for both LLVM-CFI
implementations in all tables and graphs.
Lockdown is a CFI implementation that operates on compiled binaries and supports the instru-
mentation of dynamically loaded code. To protect backward edges, Lockdown enforces a shadow
stack. For the forward edge, it instruments libraries at runtime, creating one equivalence class per
library. Consequently, the set size numbers are of the greatest interest for Lockdown. Lockdown’s
precision depends on symbol information, allowing indirect calls anywhere in a particular library if
it is stripped. Therefore, we only report the set sizes for non-stripped libraries where Lockdown is
more precise.
To collect the data for our lower bound, we wrote an LLVM pass. This pass instruments the
program to collect and report the source line for each indirect call, the number of different targets for
each indirect call, and the number of times each of those targets was used. This data is collected at
runtime. Consequently, it represents only a subset of all possible indirect calls and targets that are
required for the sample input to run. As such, we use it to present a lower bound on the number of
equivalence sets (i.e. unique indirect call sites) and size of those sets (i.e. the number of different
locations called by that site).
3.2.2. Results. We conducted three different quantitative evaluations in line with our proposed
metric for evaluating the overall security of a CFI mechanism and our lower bound. For IFCC,
3Note that the IFCC patch was pulled by the authors and will be replaced by LLVM-CFI.
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Fig. 4: Total number of forward-edge equivalence classes when running SPEC CPU2006 (higher is
better).
LLVM-CFI (3.7 and 3.9), and MCFI it is sufficient to compile the SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks as
they do not dynamically change their equivalence classes. piCFI uses dynamic information, so we
had to run the SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks. Similarly, Lockdown is a binary CFI implementation
that only operates at run time. We highlight the most interesting results in Figure 3, see Table III in
Appendix C for the full data set.
Figure 4 shows the number of equivalence classes for the five CFI implementations that we
evaluated, as well as their sub-configurations. As advertised, IFCC Single only creates one equivalence
class. This IFCC mode offers the least precision of any implementation measured. The other IFCC
analysis modes only had a noticeable impact for perlbench and soplex. Indeed, on the sjeng benchmark
all four analysis modes produced only one equivalence class.
On forward edges, MCFI and piCFI are more precise than IFCC in all cases except for perlbench
where they are equivalent. LLVM-CFI 3.9 is more precise than IFCC while being less precise than
MCFI. MCFI and piCFI are the only implementations to consider backward edges, so no comparison
with other mechanisms is possible on backward edge precision. Relative to each other, piCFI’s
dynamic information decreases the number of equivalence classes available to the attacker by 21.6%.
The authors of MCFI and piCFI recommend disabling tail calls to improve CFG precision. This only
impacts the number of sets that they create for backward edges, not forward edges, see Appendix C.
As such this compiler flag does not impact most CFI implementations, which rely on a shadow stack
for backward edge security.
LLVM-CFI 3.7 creates a number of equivalence classes equal to the number of classes used in the
C++ benchmarks. Recall that it only provides support for a subset of indirect control-flow transfer
types. However, we present the results in Figure 4 and Figure 5 to show the relative cost of protecting
vtables in C++ relative to protecting all indirect call sites.
We quantify the set sizes for each of the four implementations in Figure 5. We show box and
whisker graphs of the set sizes for each implementation. The red line is the median set size and
a smaller median set size indicates more secure mechanisms. The blue box extends from the 25th
percentile to the 75th, smaller boxes indicate a tight grouping around the median. An implementation
might have a low median, but large boxes indicate that there are still some large equivalence classes
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Fig. 5: Whisker plot of equivalence class sizes for different mechanisms when running SPEC
CPU2006. (Smaller is Better)
for an attacker to target. The top whisker extends from the top of the box for 150% of the size of the
box. Data points beyond the whiskers are considered outliers and indicate large sets. This plot format
allows an intuitive understanding of the security of the distribution of equivalence class sizes. Lower
medians and smaller boxes are better. Any data points above the top of the whisker show very large,
outlier equivalence classes that provide a large attack surface for an adversary.
Note that IFCC only creates a single equivalence class for xalancbmk and namd (except for the
Full configuration on namd which is more precise). Entries with just a single equivalence class are
reported as only a median. IFCC data points allow us to rank the different analysis methods, based on
the results for benchmarks where they actually impacted set size: perlbench and soplex. In increasing
order of precision (least precise to most precise) they are: single, arity, simplified, and full. This
does not necessarily mean that the more precise analysis methods are more secure, however. For
perlbench the more precise methods have outliers at the same level as the median for the least precise
(i.e., single) analysis. For soplex the outliers are not as bad, but the full outlier is the same size as the
median for arity. While increasing the precision of the underlying CFG analysis increases the overall
security, edge cases can cause the incremental gains to be much smaller than anticipated.
The MCFI forward-edge data points highlight this. The MCFI median is always smaller than the
IFCC median. However, for all the benchmarks where both ran, the MCFI outliers are greater than or
equal to the largest IFCC set. From a quantitative perspective, we can only confirm that MCFI is at
least as secure as IFCC. The effect of the outlying large sets on relative security remains an open
question, though it seems likely that they provide opportunities for an attacker.
LLVM-CFI 3.9 presents an interesting compromise. As the full set of whisker plots in Appendix C
shows, it has fewer outliers. However, it also has, on average, a greater median set size. Given the
open question of the importance of the outliers, LLVM-CFI 3.9 could well be more secure in practice.
LLVM-CFI 3.7 - which only protects virtual tables - sets do not have extreme outliers. Additionally,
Figure 5 shows that the equivalence classes that are created have a low variance, as seen by the more
compact whisker plots that lack the large number of outliers present for other techniques. As such,
LLVM-CFI 3.7 does not suffer from the edge cases that effect more general analyzes.
Lockdown consistently has the largest set sizes, as expected because it only creates one equivalence
class per library and the SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks are optimized to reduce the amount of external
library calls. These sets are up to an order of magnitude larger than compiler techniques. However,
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Lockdown isolates faults into libraries as each library has its independent set of targets compared to
a single set of targets for other binary-only approaches like CCFIR and bin-CFI.
The lower bound numbers were measured dynamically, and as such encapsulate a subset of the
actual equivalence sets in the static program. Further, each such set is at most the size of the static set.
Our lower bound thus provides a proxy for an ideal CFI implementation in that it is perfectly precise
for each run. However, all of the IFCC variations report fewer equivalence classes than our dynamic
bound.
The whisker plots for our dynamic lower bound in Figure 5 show that some of the SPEC CPU2006
benchmarks inherently have outliers in their set sizes. For perlbench, gcc, gobmk, h264ref, omnetpp,
and xalancbmk our dynamic lower bound and the static set sizes from the compiler-based implemen-
tations all have a significant number of outliers. This provides quantitative backing to the intuition
that some code is more amenable to protection by CFI. Evaluating what coding styles and practices
make code more or less amenable to CFI is out of scope here, but would make for interesting future
work.
Note that for namd and soplex in Figure 5 there is no visible data for our dynamic lower bound
because all the sets had a single element. This means the median size is one which is too low to be
visible. For all other mechanisms no visible data means the mechanism was incompatible with the
benchmark.
3.3. Previous Security Evaluations and Attacks
Evaluating the security of a CFI implementation is challenging because exploits are program de-
pendent and simple metrics do not cover the security of a mechanism. The Average Indirect target
Reduction (AIR) metric [Zhang and Sekar 2013] captures the average reduction of allowed targets,
following the idea that an attack is less likely if fewer targets are available. This metric and variants
were then used to measure new CFI implementations, generally reporting high numbers of more
than 99%. Such high numbers give the illusion of relatively high security but, e.g., if a binary has
1.8 MB of executable code (the size of the glibc on Ubuntu 14.04), then an AIR value of 99.9% still
allows 1,841 targets, likely enough for an arbitrary attack. A similar alternative metric to evaluate
CFI effectiveness is the gadget reduction metric [Niu and Tan 2014a]. Unfortunately, these simple
relative metrics give, at best, an intuition for security and we argue that a more rigorous metric is
needed.
A first set of attacks against CFI implementations targeted coarse-grained CFI that only had 1-3
equivalence classes [Carlini and Wagner 2014; Davi et al. 2014b; Göktas et al. 2014]. These attacks
show that equivalence classes with a large number of targets allow an attacker to execute code and
system calls, especially if return instructions are allowed to return to any call site.
Counterfeit Object Oriented Programming (COOP) [Schuster et al. 2015] introduced the idea that
whole C++ methods can be used as gadgets to implement Turing-complete computation. Virtual calls
in C++ are a specific type of indirect function calls that are dispatched via vtables, which are arrays
of function pointers. COOP shows that an attacker can construct counterfeit objects and, by reusing
existing vtables, perform arbitrary computations. This attack shows that indirect calls requiring
another level-of-indirection (e.g., through a vtable) must have additional checks that consider the
types at the language level for the security check as well.
Control Jujutsu [Evans et al. 2015b] extends the existing attacks to so-called fine-grained CFI by
leveraging the imprecision of points-to analysis. This work shows that common software engineering
practices like modularity (e.g., supporting plugins and refactoring) force points-to analysis to merge
several equivalence classes. This imprecision results in target sets that are large enough for arbitrary
computation.
Control-Flow Bending [Carlini et al. 2015] goes one step further and shows that attacks against
ideal CFI are possible. Ideal CFI assumes that a precise CFG is available that is not achievable in
practice, i.e., if any edge would be removed then the program would fail. Even in this configuration
attacks are likely possible if no shadow stack is used, and sometimes possible even if a shadow stack
is used.
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Several attacks target data structures used by CFI mechanisms. StackDefiler [Conti et al. 2015]
leverages the fact that many CFI mechanisms implement the enforcement as a compiler transfor-
mation. Due to this high-level implementation and the fact that the optimization infrastructure of
the compiler is unaware of the security aspects, an optimization might choose to spill registers that
hold sensitive CFI data to the stack where it can be modified by an attack [Abadi et al. 2005b]. Any
CFI mechanism will rely on some runtime data structures that are sometimes writeable (e.g., when
MCFI loads new libraries and merges existing sets). Missing the Point [Evans et al. 2015a] shows
that ASLR might not be enough to hide this secret data from an adversary.
4. PERFORMANCE
While the security properties of CFI (or the lack thereof for some mechanisms) have received most
scrutiny in the academic literature, performance characteristics play a large part in determining which
CFI mechanisms are likely to see adoption and which are not. Szekeres et al. [Szekeres et al. 2013]
surveyed mitigations against memory corruption and found that mitigations with more than 10%
overhead do not tend to see widespread adoption in production environments and that overheads
below 5% are desired by industry practitioners.
Comparing the performance characteristics of CFI mechanisms is a non-trivial undertaking. Dif-
ferences in the underlying hardware, operating system, as well as implementation and benchmarking
choices prevents apples-to-apples comparison between the performance overheads reported in the
literature. For this reason, we take a two-pronged approach in our performance survey: for a number
of publicly available CFI mechanisms, we measure performance directly on the same hardware
platform and, whenever possible, on the same operating system, and benchmark suite. Additionally,
we tabulate and compare the performance results reported in the literature.
We focus on the aggregate cost of CFI enforcement. For a detailed survey of the performance cost
of protecting backward edges from callees to callers we refer to the recent, comprehensive survey
by Dang et al. [2015].
4.1. Measured CFI Performance
Selection Criteria. It is infeasible to replicate the reported performance overheads for all major CFI
mechanisms. Many implementations are not publicly available or require substantial modification
to run on modern versions of Linux or Windows. We therefore focus on recent, publicly available,
compiler-based CFI mechanisms.
Several compiler-based CFI mechanisms share a common lineage. LLVM-CFI, for instance,
improves upon IFCC, piCFI improves upon MCFI, and VTI is an improved version of SafeDispatch.
In those cases, we opted to measure the latest available version and rely on reported performance
numbers for older versions.
Method. Most authors use the SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks to report the overhead of their CFI
mechanism. We follow this trend in our own replication study. All benchmarks were compiled using
the -O2 optimization level. The benchmarking system was a Dell PowerEdge T620 dual processor
server having 64GiB of main memory and two Intel Xeon E5-2660 CPUs running at 2.20 GHz. To
reduce benchmarking noise, we ran the tests on an otherwise idle system and disabled all dynamic
frequency and voltage scaling features. Whenever possible, we benchmark the implementations
under 64-bit Ubuntu Linux 14.04.2 LTS. The CFI mechanisms were baselined against the compiler
they were implemented on top of: VTV on GCC 4.9, LLVM-CFI on LLVM 3.7 and 3.9, VTI on
LLVM 3.7, MCFI on LLVM 3.5, piCFI on LLVM 3.5. Since CFGuard is part of Microsoft Visual
C++ Compiler, MSVC, we used MSVC 19 to compile and run SPEC CPU2006 on a pristine 64-bit
Windows 10 installation. We report the geometric mean overhead averaged over three benchmark
runs using the reference inputs in Table I.
Some of the CFI mechanisms we benchmark required link-time optimization, LTO, which allows
the compiler to analyze and optimize across compilation units. LLVM-CFI and VTI both require LTO,
so for these mechanisms, we report overheads relative to a baseline SPEC CPU2006 run that also had
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LTO enabled. The increased optimization scope enabled by LTO can allow the compiler to perform
additional optimizations such as de-virtualization to lower the cost of CFI enforcement. On the other
hand, LLVM’s LTO is less practical than traditional, separate compilation, e.g., when compiling
large, complex code bases. To measure the piCFI mechanism, we applied the author’s patches4 for
7 of the SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks to remove coding constructs that are not handled by piCFI’s
control-flow graph analysis [Niu and Tan 2014a]. Likewise, the authors of VTI provided a patch for
the xalancbmk benchmark. It updates code that casts an object instance to its sibling class, which
can cause a CFI violation. We found these patches for hmmer, povray, and xalancbmk to also be
necessary for LLVM-CFI 3.9, which otherwise reports a CFI violation on these benchmarks. VTI was
run in interleaved vtable mode which provides the best performance according to its authors [Bounov
et al. 2016].
Results. Our performance experiments show that recent, compiler-based CFI mechanisms have
mean overheads in the low single digit range. Such low overhead is well within the threshold
for adoption specified by [Szekeres et al. 2013] of 5%. This dispenses with the concern that CFI
enforcement is too costly in practice compared to alternative mitigations including those based on
randomization [Larsen et al. 2014]. Indeed, mechanisms such as CFGuard, LLVM-CFI, and VTV
are implemented in widely-used compilers, offering some level of CFI enforcement to practitioners.
We expect CFI mechanisms that are limited to virtual method calls—VTV, VTI, LLVM-CFI
3.7— to have lower mean overheads than those that also protect indirect function calls such as IFCC.
The return protection mechanism used by MCFI should introduce additional overhead, and piCFI’s
runtime policy ought to result in a further marginal increase in overhead. In practice, our results show
that LLVM-CFI 3.7 and VTI are the fastest, followed by CFGuard, piCFI, and VTV. The reported
numbers for IFCC when run in single mode show that it achieves -0.3%, likely due to cache effects.
Although our measured overheads are not directly comparable with those reported by the authors
of the seminal CFI paper, we find that researchers have managed to improve the precision while
lowering the cost5 of enforcement as the result of a decade worth of research into CFI enforcement.
The geometric mean overheads do not tell the whole story, however. It is important to look closer at
the performance impact on benchmarks that execute a high number of indirect branches. Protecting the
xalancbmk, omnetpp, and povray C++ benchmarks with CFI generally incurs substantial overheads.
All benchmarked CFI mechanisms had above-average overheads on xalancbmk. LLVM-CFI and
VTV, which take virtual call semantics into account, were particularly affected. On the other hand,
xalancbmk highlights the merits of the recent virtual table interleaving mechanism of VTI which has
a relatively low 3.7% overhead (vs. 1.4% reported) on this challenging benchmark.
Although povray is written in C++, it makes few virtual method calls [Zhang et al. 2015]. However,
it performs a large number of indirect calls. The CFI mechanisms which protect indirect calls—piCFI,
and CFGuard—all incur high performance overheads on povray. Sjeng and h264ref also include a
high number of indirect calls which again result in non-negligible overheads particularly when using
piCFI with tail calls disabled to improve CFG precision. The hmmer, namd, and bzip2 benchmarks
on the other hand show very little overhead as they do not execute a high number of forward indirect
branches of any kind. Therefore these benchmarks are of little value when comparing the performance
of various CFI mechanisms.
Overall, our measurements generally match those reported in the literature. The authors of
VTV [Tice et al. 2014] only report overheads for the three SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks that were
impacted the most. Our measurements confirm the authors’ claim that the runtimes of the other C++
benchmarks are virtually unaffected. The leftmost piCFI column should be compared to the reported
column for piCFI. We measured overheads higher than those reported by Niu and Tan. Both gobmk
and xalancbmk show markedly higher performance overheads in our experiments; we believe this is
4The patches are available at: https://github.com/mcfi/MCFI/tree/master/spec2006.
5Non-CFI related hardware improvements, such as better branch prediction [Rohou et al. 2015], also help to reduce
performance overhead.
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)
0.1
0.7
0.1
-0.1
0.0
0.0
1.0
3.0
10.0
0.0
-0.5
458.sjeng(C
)
1.6
3.4
8.4
11.9
5.0
5.0
0.0
80.0
40.0
0.0
-2.5
464.h264ref(C
)
5.3
5.4
7.9
8.3
6.0
6.0
1.0
43.0
45.0
1.0
28.0
462.libquantum
(C
)
-6.9
-3.0
-1.0
-0.3
0.0
3.0
5.0
10.0
0.0
-0.5
471.om
netpp(+)
5.8
-1.9
C
F
C
F
3.8
6.7
18.8
8.0
1.2
5.0
-1.2
5.0
2.0
45.0
473.astar(+)
3.6
-0.3
0.9
1.6
0.1
2.0
2.9
2.4
0.1
4.0
-0.2
3.5
17.0
75.0
0.0
14.0
483.xalancbm
k(+)
24.0
7.1
7.2
3.7
5.5
10.3
17.6
19.2
1.4
7.0
3.1
7.0
118.0
170.0
15.0
410.bw
aves(F)
1.0
416.gam
ess(F)
11.0
433.m
ilc(C
)
0.2
2.0
-1.7
1.4
2.0
2.0
4.0
8.0
2.5
434.zeusm
p(F)
0.0
435.grom
acs(C
,F)
1.0
436.cactusA
D
M
(C
,F)
0.0
437.leslie3d(F)
1.0
444.nam
d(+)
-0.1
-0.2
0.1
-0.3
0.1
-0.3
-0.5
-0.5
-0.2
-0.5
3.0
-2.0
447.dealII(+)
0.7
C
F
7.9
C
F
-0.1
5.3
4.4
4.5
-2.2
4.5
450.soplex(+)
0.5
0.5
-0.3
-0.6
2.3
-0.7
0.9
-0.7
-4.0
-1.7
-4.0
12.0
3.5
453.povray(+)
-0.6
1.5
8.9
2.0
10.8
11.3
17.4
10.5
0.2
10.0
90.0
37.0
454.calculix(C
,F)
3.0
459.gem
sFD
T
D
(F)
7.0
465.tonto(F)
19.0
470.lbm
(C
)
-0.2
4.2
-0.2
-0.5
1.0
1.0
0.0
2.0
-2.5
482.sphinx3(C
)
-0.8
-0.1
0.7
2.4
1.5
1.5
3.0
8.0
0.5
G
eo
M
ean
4.6
1.1
4.4
1.3
2.3
4.0
5.8
9.6
0.5
3.2
-0.3
2.9
3.0
20.0
45.0
2.6
8.5
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in part explained by the fact that Niu and Tan used a newer Intel Xeon processor having an improved
branch predictor [Rohou et al. 2015] and higher clock speeds (3.4 vs 2.2 GHz).
We ran piCFI in both normal mode and with tail calls disabled. The geometric mean overhead
increased by 1.9% with tail calls disabled. Disabling tail calls in turn increases the number of
equivalence classes on each benchmark Figure 4. This is a classic example of the performance/security
precision trade-off when designing CFI mechanisms. Implementers can choose the most precise
policy within their performance target. CFGuard offers the most efficient protection of forward
indirect branches whereas piCFI offers higher security at slightly higher cost.
4.2. Reported CFI Performance
The right-hand side of Table I lists reported overheads on SPEC CPU2006 for CFI mechanisms
that we do not measure. IFCC is the first CFI mechanism implemented in LLVM which was later
replaced by LLVM-CFI. MCFI is the precursor to piCFI. PathArmor is a recent CFI mechanism that
uses dynamic binary rewriting and a hardware feature, the Last Branch Record (LBR) [Intel Inc.
2013] register, that traces the 16 most recently executed indirect control-flow transfers. Lockdown
is a pure dynamic binary translation approach to CFI that includes precise enforcement of returns
using a shadow stack. C-CFI is a compiler-based approach which stores a cryptographically-secure
hash-based message authentication code, HMAC, next to each pointer. Checking the HMAC of a
pointer before indirect branches avoids a static points-to analysis to generate a CFG. ROPecker is
a CFI mechanism that uses a combination of offline analysis, traces recorded by the LBR register,
and emulation in an attempt to detect ROP attacks. Finally, the bin-CFI approach uses static binary
rewriting like the original CFI mechanism; bin-CFI is notable for its ability to protect stripped,
position-independent ELF binaries that do not contain relocation information.
The reported overheads match our measurements: xalancbmk and povray impose the highest
overheads—up to 15% for ROPecker, which otherwise exhibits low overheads, and 1.7x for C-CFI.
The interpreter benchmark, perlbench, executes a high number of indirect branches, which leads to
high overheads, particularly for Lockdown, PathArmor, and bin-CFI.
Looking at CFI mechanisms that do not require re-compilation—PathArmor, Lockdown,
ROPecker, and bin-CFI we see that the mechanisms that only check the contents of the LBR
before system calls (PathArmor and ROPecker) report lower mean overheads than approaches that
comprehensively instrument indirect branches (Lockdown and bin-CFI) in existing binaries. More
broadly, comparing compiler-based mechanisms with binary-level mechanisms, we see that compiler-
based approaches are typically as efficient as the binary-level mechanisms that trace control flows
using the LBR although compiler-based mechanisms do not limit protection to a short window of
recently executed branches. More comprehensive binary-level mechanisms, Lockdown and bin-CFI
generally have higher overheads than compiler-based equivalents. On the other hand, Lockdown
shows the advantage of binary translation: almost any program can be analyzed and protected,
independent from the compiler and source code. Also note that Lockdown incurs additional overhead
for its shadow stack, while none of the other mechanisms in Table I have a shadow stack.
Although we cannot directly compare the reported overheads of bin-CFI with our measured
overheads for CFGuard, the mechanisms enforce CFI policies of roughly similar precision (compare
Figure 2i and Figure 2w). CFGuard, however, has a substantially lower performance overhead. This
is not surprising given that compilers operate on a high-level program representation that is more
amenable to static program analysis and optimization of the CFI instrumentation. On the other hand,
compiler-based CFI mechanisms are not strictly faster than binary-level mechanisms, C-CFI has the
highest reported overheads by far although it is implemented in the LLVM compiler.
Table II surveys CFI approaches that do not report overheads using the SPEC CPU2006 bench-
marks like the majority of recent CFI mechanisms do. Some authors, use an older version of the
SPEC benchmarks [Abadi et al. 2005a; Mohan et al. 2015] whereas others evaluate performance
using, e.g., web browsers [Jang et al. 2014; Zhang et al. 2013], or web servers [Payer et al. 2015; Xia
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et al. 2012]. Although it is valuable to quantify overheads of CFI enforcement on more modern and
realistic programs, it remains helpful to include the overheads for SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks.
Table II: CFI performance overhead (%) reported from previous publications. A label of C indicates
we computed the geometric mean overhead over the listed benchmarks, otherwise it is the published
average.
Benchmarks Overhead
ROPGuard [Fratric 2012] PCMark Vantage, NovaBench, 3DMark06, Peacekeeper, 0.5%
Sunspider, SuperPI 16M
SafeDispatch [Jang et al. 2014] Octane, Kraken, Sunspider, Balls, linelayout, HTML5 2.0%
CCFIR [Zhang et al. 2013] SPEC2kINT, SPEC2kFP, SPEC2k6INT C 2.1%
kBouncer [Pappas et al. 2013] wmplayer, Internet Explorer, Adobe Reader C 4.0%
OCFI [Mohan et al. 2015] SPEC2k 4.7%
CFIMon [Xia et al. 2012] httpd, Exim, Wu-ftpd, Memcached 6.1%
Original CFI [Abadi et al. 2005a] SPEC2k 16.0%
4.3. Discussion
As Table I shows, authors working in the area of CFI seem to agree to evaluate their mechanisms
using the SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks. There is, however, less agreement on whether to include
both the integer and floating point subsets. The authors of Lockdown report the most complete set of
benchmark results covering both integer and floating point benchmarks and the authors of bin-CFI,
piCFI, and MCFI include most of the integer benchmarks and a subset of the floating point ones. The
authors of VTV and IFCC only report subsets of integer and floating point benchmarks where their
solutions introduce non-negligible overheads. Except for CFI mechanisms focused on a particular
type of control flows such as virtual method calls, authors should strive to report overheads on the full
suite of SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks. In case there is insufficient time to evaluate a CFI mechanism
on all benchmarks, we strongly encourage authors to focus on the ones that are challenging to protect
with low overheads. These include perlbench, gcc, gobmk, sjeng, omnetpp, povray, and xalancbmk.
Additionally, it is desirable to supplement SPEC CPU2006 measurements with measurements for
large, frequently targeted applications such as web browsers and web servers.
Although “traditional” CFI mechanisms (e.g., those that check indirect branch targets using a
pre-computed CFG) can be implemented most efficiently in a compiler, this does not automatically
make such solutions superior to binary-level CFI mechanisms. The advantages of the latter type of
approaches include, most prominently, the ability to work directly on stripped binaries when the
corresponding source is unavailable. This allows CFI enforcement to be applied independently of the
code producer and therefore puts the performance/security trade off in the hands of the end-users
or system administrators. Moreover, binary-level solutions naturally operate on the level of entire
program modules irrespective of the source language, compiler, and compilation mode that was used
to generate the code. Implementers of compiler-based CFI solutions on the other hand must spend
additional effort to support separate compilation or require LTO operation which, in some instances,
lowers the usability of the CFI mechanism [Szekeres et al. 2013].
5. CROSS-CUTTING CONCERNS
This section discusses CFI enforcement mechanisms, presents calls to action identified by our study
for the CFI community, and identifies current frontiers in CFI research.
5.1. Enforcement Mechanisms
The CFI precursor Program Shepherding [Kiriansky et al. 2002] was built on top of a dynamic
optimization engine, RIO. For CFI like security policies, Program Shepherding effects the way RIO
links basic blocks together on indirect calls. They improve the performance overhead of this approach
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by maintaining traces, or sequences of basic blocks, in which they only have to check that the indirect
branch target is the same.
Many CFI papers follow the ID-based scheme presented by Abadi et. al [Abadi et al. 2005a].
This scheme assigns a label to each indirect control flow transfer, and to each potential target in the
program. Before the transfer, they insert instrumentation to insure that the label of the control flow
transfer matches the label of the destination.
Recent work from Google [Collingbourne 2015; Tice et al. 2014] and Microsoft [Microsoft
2015] has moved beyond the ID-based schemes to optimized set checks. These rely on aligning
metadata such that pointer transformations can be performed quickly before indirect jumps. These
transformations guarantee that the indirect jump target is valid.
Hardware-Supported Enforcement Modern processors offer several hardware security-oriented
features. Data Execution Prevention is a classical example of how a simple hardware feature can
eliminate an entire class of attacks. Many processors also support AES encryption, random number
generation, secure enclaves, and array bounds checking via instruction set extensions.
Researchers have explored architectural support for CFI enforcement [Arias et al. 2015; Chris-
toulakis et al. 2016; Davi et al. 2014a; Sullivan et al. 2016] with the goal of lowering performance
overheads. A particular advantage of these solutions is that backward edges can be protected by
a fully-isolated shadow stack with an average overhead of just 2% for protection of forward and
backward edges. This stands in contrast to the average overheads for software-based shadow stacks
which range from 3 to 14% according to Dang et al. [2015].
There have also been efforts to repurpose existing hardware mechanisms to implement CFI [Cheng
et al. 2014; Pappas et al. 2013; van der Veen et al. 2015; Yuan et al. 2015]. Pappas et al. [2013]
were first to demonstrate a CFI mechanism using the 16-entry LBR branch trace facility of Intel
x86 processors. The key idea in their kBouncer solution is to check the control flow path that led up
to a potentially dangerous system call by inspecting the LBR; a heuristic was used to distinguish
execution traces induced by ROP chains from legitimate execution traces. ROPecker by Cheng
et al. [2014] subsequently extended LBR-based CFI enforcement to also emulate what code would
execute past the system call. While these approaches offer negligible overheads and do not require
recompilation of existing code, subsequent research showed that carefully crafted ROP attacks can
bypass both of these mechanisms [Carlini and Wagner 2014; Davi et al. 2014b; Göktas et al. 2014].
The CFIGuard mechanism [Yuan et al. 2015] uses the LBR feature in conjunction with hardware
performance counters to heuristically detect ROP attacks. [Xia et al. 2012] used the branch trace
store, which records control-flow transfers to a buffer in memory, rather than the LBR for CFI
enforcement. Mashtizadeh et al. [2015]’s C-CFI uses the Intel AES-NI instruction set to compute
cryptographically-enforced hash-based message authentication codes, HMACs, for pointers stored in
attacker-observable memory. By verifying HMACs before pointers are used, C-CFI prevents control-
flow hijacking. Mohan et al. [2015] leverage Intel’s MPX instruction set extension by re-casting the
problem of CFI enforcement as a bounds checking problem over a randomized CFG.
Most recently, Intel announced hardware support for CFI in future x86 processors [Patel 2016].
Intel Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) adds two new instructions, ENDBR32 and
ENDBR64, for forward edge protection. Under CET, the target of any indirect jump or indirect call
must be a ENDBR instruction. This provides coarse-grained protection where any of the possible
indirect targets are allowed at every indirect control-flow transfer. There is only one equivalence
class which contains every ENDBR instruction in the program. For backward edges, CET provides a
new Shadow Stack Pointer (SSP) register which is exclusively manipulated by new shadow stack
instructions. Memory used by the shadow stack resides in virtual memory and is protected with page
permissions. In summary, CET provides precise backward edge protection using a shadow stack, but
forward edge protection is imprecise because there is only one possible label for destinations.
5.2. Open Problems
As seen in Section 3.1 most existing CFI implementations use ad hoc, imprecise analysis techniques
when constructing their CFG. This unnecessarily weakens these mechanisms, as seen in Section 3.2.
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All future work in CFI should use flow-sensitive and context-sensitive analysis for forward edges,
SAP.F.5 from Section 2.3. On backward edges, we recommend shadow stacks as they have negligible
overhead and are more precise than any possible static analysis. In this same vein, a study of real
world applications that identifies coding practices that lead to large equivalence classes would be
immensely helpful. This could lead to coding best practices that dramatically increase the security
provided by CFI.
Quantifying the incremental security provided by CFI, or any other security mechanism, is an
open problem. However, a large adversarial analysis study would provide additional insight into the
security provided by CFI. Further, it is likely that CFI could be adapted as a result of such a study to
make attacks more difficult.
5.3. Research Frontiers
Recent trends in CFI research target improving CFI in directions beyond new analysis or enforcement
algorithms. Some approaches have sought to increase CFI protection coverage to include just-in-time
code and operating system kernels. Others leverage advances in hardware to improve performance or
enable new enforcement strategies. We discuss these research directions in the CFI landscape which
cross-cut the traditional categories of performance and security.
Protecting Operating System Kernels. In monolithic kernels, all kernel software is running at
the same privilege levels and any memory corruption can be fatal for security. A kernel is vastly
different from a user-space application as it is directly exposed to the underlying hardware and an
attacker in that space has access to privileged instructions that may change interrupts, page table
structures, page table permissions, or privileged data structures. KCoFI [Criswell et al. 2014a]
introduces a first CFI policy for commodity operating systems and considers these specific problems.
The CFI mechanism is fairly coarse-grained: any indirect function call may target any valid functions
and returns may target any call site (instead of executable bytes). Xinyang Ge et al. [Ge et al. 2016]
introduce a precise CFI policy inference mechanism by leveraging common function pointer usage
patterns in kernel code (SAP.F.4b on the forward edge and SAP.B.1 on the backward edge).
Protecting Just-in-time Compiled Code. Like other defenses, it is important that CFI is de-
ployed comprehensively since adversaries only have to find a single unprotected indirect branch
to compromise the entire process. Some applications contain just-in-time, JIT, compilers that dy-
namically emit machine code for managed languages such as Java and JavaScript. Niu and Tan
[2014b] presented RockJIT, a CFI mechanism that specifically targets the additional attack surface
exposed by JIT compilers. RockJIT faces two challenges unique to dynamically-generated code:
(i) the code heap used by JIT compilers is usually simultaneously writable and executable to allow
important optimizations such as inline caching [Hölzle and Ungar 1994] and on-stack replacement,
(ii) computing the control-flow graphs for dynamic languages during execution without imposing
substantial performance overheads. RockJIT solves the first challenge by replacing the original heap
with a shadow code heap which is readable and writable but not executable and by introducing a
sandboxed code heap which is readable and executable, but not writable. To avoid increased memory
consumption, RockJIT maps the sandboxed code heap and the shadow heap to the same physical
memory pages with different permissions. RockJIT addresses the second challenge by both (i)
modifying the JIT compiler to emit meta-data about indirect branches in the generated code and (ii)
enforcing a coarse-grained CFI policy on JITed code which avoids the need for static analysis. The
authors argue that a less precise CFI policy for JITed code is acceptable as long as both (i) the host
application is protected by a more precise policy and (ii) JIT-compiled code prevents adversaries from
making system calls. In the Edge browser, Microsoft has updated the JIT compilers for JavaScript
and Flash to instrument generated calls and to inform CFGuard of new control-flow targets through
calls to SetProcessValidCallTargets [Falcon 2015; Miscosoft 2015; Weston and Miller
2016].
Protecting Interpreters. Control-flow integrity for interpreters faces similar challenges as just-in-
time compilers. Interpreters are widely deployed, e.g., two major web browsers, Internet Explorer
and Safari, rely on mixed-mode execution models that interpret code until it becomes “hot” enough
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for just-in-time compilation [Aycock 2003], and some Desktop software, too, is interpreted, e.g.,
Dropbox’s client is implemented in Python. We have already described the “worst-case” interpreters
pose to CFI from a security perspective: even if the interpreter’s code is protected by CFI, its
actual functionality is determined by a program in data memory. This separation has two important
implications: (i) static analysis for an interpreter dispatch routine will result in an over-approximation,
and (ii) it enables non-control data attacks through manipulating program source code in writeable
data memory prior to JIT compilation.
Interpreters are inherently dynamic, which on the one hand means, CFI for interpreters could rely
on precise dynamic points-to information, but on the other hand also indicates problems to build
a complete control-flow graph for such programs. Dynamically executing strings as code (eval)
further complicates this. Any CFI mechanism for interpreters needs to address this challenge.
Protecting Method Dispatch in Object-Oriented Languages. In C/C++ method calls use vta-
bles, which contain addresses to methods, to dynamically bind methods according to the dynamic
type of an object. This mechanism is, however, not the only possible way to implement dynamic
binding. Predating C++, for example, is Smalltalk-style method dispatch, which influenced the
method dispatch mechanisms in other languages, such as Objective-C and JavaScript. In Smalltalk,
all method calls are resolved using a dedicated function called send. This send function takes two
parameters: (i) the object (also called the receiver of the method call), and (ii) the method name.
Using these parameters, the send method determines, at call-time, which method to actually invoke.
In general, the determination of which methods are eligible call targets, and which methods cannot
be invoked for certain objects and classes cannot be computed statically. Moreover, since objects and
classes are both data, manipulation of data to hijack control-flow suffices to influence the method
dispatch for malicious intent. While Pewny and Holz [Pewny and Holz 2013] propose a mechanism
for Objective-C send-like dispatch, the generalisation to Smalltalk-style dispatch remains unsolved.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Control-flow integrity substantially raises the bar against attacks that exploit memory corruption
vulnerabilities to execute arbitrary code. In the decade since its inception, researchers have made
major advances and explored a great number of materially different mechanisms and implementation
choices. Comparing and evaluating these mechanisms is non-trivial and most authors only provide
ad-hoc security and performance evaluations. A prerequisite to any systematic evaluation is a set
of well-defined metrics. In this paper, we have proposed metrics to qualitatively (based on the
underlying analysis) and quantitatively (based on a practical evaluation) assess the security benefits
of a representative sample of CFI mechanisms. Additionally, we have evaluated the performance
trade-offs and have surveyed cross-cutting concerns and their impacts on the applicability of CFI.
Our systematization serves as an entry point and guide to the now voluminous and diverse
literature on control-flow integrity. Most importantly, we capture the current state of the art in terms
of precision and performance. We report large variations in the forward and backward edge precision
for the evaluated mechanisms with corresponding performance overhead: higher precision results in
(slightly) higher performance overhead.
We hope that our unified nomenclature will gradually displace the ill-defined qualitative distinc-
tion between “fine-grained” and “coarse-grained” labels that authors apply inconsistently across
publications. Our metrics provide the necessary guidance and data to compare CFI implementations
in a more nuanced way. This helps software developers and compiler writers gain appreciation for
the performance/security trade-off between different CFI mechanisms. For the security community,
this work provides a map of what has been done, and highlights fertile grounds for future research.
Beyond metrics, our unified nomenclature allows clear distinctions of mechanisms. These metrics, if
adopted, are useful to evaluate and describe future improvements to CFI.
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B. PRIOR WORK ON STATIC ANALYSIS
Static analysis research has attracted significant interest from the research community. Following
our classification of control-flows in Section 2.2, we are particularly interested in static analysis that
identifies indirect calls/jump targets. Researchers refer to this kind of static analysis as points-to
analysis. The wealth of information and results in points-to analysis goes well beyond the scope
of this paper. We refer the interested reader to Smaragdakis and Balatsouras [Smaragdakis and
Balatsouras 2015] and focus our attention on how points-to analysis affects CFI precision.
B.1. A Theoretical Perspective
Many compiler optimizations benefit from points-to analysis. As a result, points-to analysis must
be sound at all times and therefore conservatively over-approximates results. The program analysis
literature (e.g., [Hind 2001; Hind and Pioli 2000; Nielson et al. 1999; Smaragdakis and Balatsouras
2015]) expresses this conservative aspect as a may-analysis: A specific object “may” point to any
members of a computed points-to set.
For the purposes of this paper, the following orthogonal dimensions in points-to analysis affect
precision:
— flow-sensitive vs. flow-insensitive: this dimension states whether an analysis considers control-flow
(sensitive) or not (insensitive).
— context-sensitive vs. context-insensitive: this dimension states whether an analysis considers vari-
ous forms of context (sensitive) or not (insensitive). The literature further separates the following
context information sub-categories: (i) call-site sensitive: the context includes a function’s call-site
(e.g., call-strings [Sharir and Pnueli 1981]), (ii) object sensitive: the context includes the specific
receiver object present at a call-site [Milanova et al. 2002], (iii) type sensitive: the context includes
type information of functions or objects at a call-site [Smaragdakis et al. 2011].
Both dimensions, context and flow sensitivity, are orthogonal and a points-to analysis combining
both yields higher precision.
Flow-Sensitivity. Figures 6a – 6c show the effect of flow sensitivity on points-to analysis. A
flow-sensitive analysis considers the state of the program per line. We see, for instance, in Figure 6b
how a flow-sensitive analysis computes the proper object type per allocation site. A flow-insensitive
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Object o;
o= new A();
...
o= new B();
(a) Flow-sensitivity example.
o→ A
...
o→ B
(b) Flow-sensitive result.
o→ {A, B}
(c) Flow-insensitive result.
// identity function
Object id(Object o) { return o; }
x= new A();
y= new B();
a= id(x);
b= id(y);
(d) Context-sensitivity example.
x→ A
y → B
a→ A; id1 → A
b→ B; id2 → B
(e) Context-sensitive result.
x→ A
y → B
a→ id; id→ A
b→ id; id→ {A, B}
(f) Context-insensitive result.
Fig. 6: Effects of flow/context sensitivity on precision.
analysis, on the other hand, computes sets that are valid for the whole program. Or, simply put, it
lumps all statements of the analyzed block (intra- or interprocedural) into one set and computes a
single points-to set that satisfies all of these statements. From a CFI perspective, a flow-sensitive
points-to analysis offers higher precision.
Context-Sensitivity. Figures 6d – 6f show the effects of context sensitivity on points-to analysis. In
Figure 6d we see that the function id is called twice, with parameters of different dynamic types.
Context-insensitive analysis (cf. Figure 6f), does not distinguish between the two different calling
contexts and therefore computes an over-approximation by lumping all invocations into one points-to
set (e.g., the result of calling id is a set with two members). A context-insensitive analysis, put
differently, considers a function independent from its callers, and is therefore the forward control-flow
transfer symmetric case of a backward control-flow transfers returning to many callers [Nielson
et al. 1999]. Context-sensitive analysis (cf. Figure 6e), on the other hand, uses additional context
information to compute higher precision results. The last two lines in Figure 6e illustrate the higher
precision by inferring the proper dynamic types A and B. From a CFI perspective, a context-sensitive
points-to analysis offers higher precision.
Object-Oriented Programming Languages. A C-like language requires call-string or type context-
sensitivity to compute precise results for function pointers. Due to dynamic dispatch, however, a
C++-like language should consider more context provided by object sensitivity [Lhoták and Hendren
2006; Milanova et al. 2002]. Alternatively, prior work describes several algorithms to “devirtualize”
call-sites. If a static analysis identifies that only one receiver is possible for a given call-site (i.e., if
the points-to set is a singleton) a compiler can sidestep expensive dynamic dispatch via the vtable
and generate a direct call to the referenced method. Class-hierarchy analysis (CHA) [Dean et al.
1995] and rapid-type analysis (RTA) [Bacon and Sweeney 1996] are prominent examples that use
domain-specific information about the class hierarchy to optimize virtual method calls. RTA differs
from CHA by pruning entries from the class hierarchy from objects that have not been instantiated.
As a result, the RTA precision is higher than CHA precision [Grove and Chambers 2001]. Grove and
Chambers [Grove and Chambers 2001] study the topic of call-graph construction and present a partial
order of various approaches’ precision (Figure 19, pg. 735). With regards to CFI, higher precision
in the call-graph of virtual method invocations translates to either (i) more de-virtualized call-sites,
which replace an indirect call by a direct call, or (ii) shrinking the points-to sets, which reduce an
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f
g
h
{f, g}
Fig. 7: Backward control-flow precision. Solid lines correspond to function calls and dashed lines to
returns from functions to their call sites. Call-sites are singletons whereas h’s return can return to
two callers.
adversary’s attack surface. Note that the former, de-virtualization of a call-site also has the added
benefit of removing the call-site from a points-to set and transforming an indirect control-flow transfer
to a direct control-flow transfer that need not be validated by the CFI enforcement component.
B.2. A Practical Perspective
Points-to analysis over-approximation reduces precision and therefore restricts the optimization
potential of programs. The reduced precision also lowers precision for CFI, opening the door for
attackers. If, for instance, the over-approximated set of computed targets contains many more
“reachable” targets, then an attacker can use those control-flow transfers without violating the CFI
policy. Consequently, prior results from studying the precision of static points-to analysis are of key
importance to understanding CFI policies’ security properties.
Mock et al. have studied dynamic points-to sets and compared them to statically determined
points-to sets [Mock et al. 2001]. More precisely, the study used an instrumentation framework
to compute dynamic points-to sets and compared them with three flow- and context-insensitive
points-to algorithms. The authors report that static analyses identified 14% of all points-to sets as
singletons, whereas dynamic points-to sets were singletons in 97% of all cases. In addition, the
study reports that one out of two statically computed singleton points-to sets were optimal in the
sense that the dynamic points-to sets were also singletons. The authors describe some caveats and
state that flow and context sensitive points-to analyses were not practical in evaluation since they
did not scale to practical programs. Subsequent work has, however, established the scalability of
such points-to analyses [Hackett and Aiken 2006; Hardekopf and Lin 2007, 2011], and a similar
experiment evaluating the precision of computed results is warranted.
Concerning the analysis of devirtualized method calls, prior work reports the following results.
By way of manual inspection, Rountev et al. [Rountev et al. 2004] report that 26% of call chains
computed by RTA were actually infeasible. Lhotak and Hendren [Lhoták and Hendren 2006] studied
the effect of context-sensitivity to improve precision on object-oriented programs. They find that
context sensitivity has only a modest effect on call-graph precision, but also report substantial benefits
of context sensitivity to resolve virtual calls. In particular, Lhotak and Hendren highlight the utility
of object-sensitive analyses for this task. Tip and Palsberg [Tip and Palsberg 2000] present advanced
algorithms, XTA among others, and report that it improves precision over RTA, on average, by 88%.
B.3. Backward Control Flows
Figure 7 shows two functions, f and g, which call another function h. The return instruction in
function h can, therefore, return to either function f or g, depending on which function actually called
h at run-time. To select the proper caller, the compiler maintains and uses a stack of activation records,
also known as stack frames. Each stack frame contains information about the CPU instruction pointer
of the caller as well as bookkeeping information for local variables.
Since there is only one return instruction at the end of a function, even the most precise static
analysis can only infer the set of callers for all calls. Computing this set, inevitably, leads to
imprecision and all call-sites of a given function must therefore share the same label/ID such that
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the CFI check succeeds. Presently, the only known alternative to this loss of precision is to maintain
a shadow stack and check whether the current return address equals the return address of the most
recent call instruction.
C. FULL QUANTITATIVE SECURITY RESULTS
This appendix presents the full quantitative security results. An abbreviated version of these results
was presented in Section 3.2. The full results are presented here for completeness. Table III contains
the number of equivalence sets for each benchmark and every CFI mechanism that we evaluated.
Figure 8 contains the full set of box and whisker plots. As this data is fundamentally three dimensional,
these plots are the best way to display it. As a final note, the holes in this data reflect the fact that
the CFI mechanisms that we evaluated cannot run the full set of SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks. This
greatly complicates the task of comparatively evaluating them, as there is only a narrow base of
programs that all the CFI mechanisms run.
Benchmark CFI Implementation
MCFI piCFI MCFI piCFI MCFI piCFI MCFI piCFI IFCC LLVM-CFI Lock- Dynamic
back edge forward edge single arity simpl. full 3.7 3.9 down
no tail call no tail call
400.perlbench 978 310 1192 429 38 30 38 30 1 6 12 40 0 36 4 83
401.bzip2 484 82 489 86 14 10 14 10 1 2 2 2 0 2 3 12
403.gcc 2219 1260 3282 1836 98 90 98 90 0 0 0 0 0 94 3 197
429.mcf 475 96 475 96 12 8 12 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0
445.gobmk 922 283 1075 230 21 17 21 17 0 0 0 0 0 11 4 0
456.hmmer 663 134 720 147 14 9 14 9 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 9
458.sjeng 540 119 557 125 13 9 13 9 1 1 1 1 0 1 3 1
462.libquantum 495 88 519 102 12 8 12 8 1 1 1 1 0 0 4 0
464.h264ref 773 285 847 327 21 15 21 15 0 0 0 0 0 9 4 59
471.omnetpp 1693 581 1784 624 357 321 357 321 0 0 0 0 114 35 0 224
473.astar 1096 226 1108 237 166 150 166 150 0 0 0 0 1 1 6 1
483.xalancbmk 6161 2381 7162 2869 1534 1200 1534 1200 0 0 0 0 2197 260 6 1402
433.milc 602 169 628 180 13 9 13 9 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 3
444.namd 1080 217 1087 224 166 150 166 150 1 1 1 5 4 4 6 12
447.dealII 2952 817 3468 896 293 258 293 258 0 0 0 0 43 15 0 95
450.soplex 1444 432 1569 479 321 291 321 291 1 7 0 186 41 9 6 157
453.povray 1748 650 1934 743 218 204 218 204 0 0 0 0 29 33 6 49
470.lbm 465 70 470 74 12 8 12 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0
482.sphinx3 633 239 677 257 13 9 13 9 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 2
Table III: Full quantitative security results for number of equivalence classes.
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Fig. 8: Whisker plot of equivalence classes size for all SPEC CPU2006 benchmarks across all
implementations (smaller is better).
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